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∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 





FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Evan Lawbaugh appeals from the District Court’s judgment reentering his originally 
imposed 40-year sentence.  We conclude that this appeal is barred by the waiver provision 
in Lawbaugh’s plea agreement, decline to decide the merits of his claims, and otherwise 
affirm the District Court’s decision.1   
I.  
 Lawbaugh pled guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).  Under the terms of his plea agreement, Lawbaugh waived his right 
to appeal his conviction and sentence.2  At sentencing, Lawbaugh presented mitigating 
testimony and other evidence regarding his Asperger’s diagnosis.  The Government then 
requested the maximum possible sentence of 100 years’ imprisonment.  Lawbaugh urged 
the District Court to instead impose the mandatory minimum of 25 years.  The District 




1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
2 The waiver provision states, in relevant part, that “the defendant knowingly waives 
the right to appeal the conviction and sentence.  This waiver includes any and all possible 
grounds for appeal, whether constitutional or non-constitutional, including, but not limited 
to, the manner in which that sentence was determined in light of United States v. Booker, 





Lawbaugh did not directly appeal his sentence.  Instead, he filed a post-conviction 
motion in the District Court to vacate it on other grounds.  Lawbaugh argued that he did 
not knowingly waive his right to appeal and the waiver was therefore invalid, and that his 
then-counsel was ineffective for several other reasons.  The District Court rejected nearly 
all of these claims, but concluded that Lawbaugh had been prejudiced by his counsel’s 
failure to file a notice of appeal before the deadline expired.  It explained that while the 
appellate waiver precluded Lawbaugh from appealing his conviction and sentence, there 
are other appellate rights that cannot be waived.  Thus, despite the waiver, counsel should 
have filed a notice of appeal to preserve review of those unwaivable issues.  The District 
Court granted Lawbaugh’s motion in part, solely to provide him with an opportunity to file 
a notice of appeal, but otherwise reentered the same 40-year sentence. 
II.3 
A. 
 Despite the appellate waiver, Lawbaugh now asks us to vacate his sentence as both 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  He argues that the waiver provision does not 
bar this appeal because he is challenging the reentered 40-year sentence, not the original 
40-year sentence.  Lawbaugh concedes that the waiver bars him from challenging “the 
 
 
3 “We examine the legality of waiver-of-appeals provisions de novo, as it is a 





conviction and [original] sentence,” but that it “did not contemplate a subsequent 
ineffective assistance claim that vacated the original sentence and a subsequent entry of 
another sentence.”4  Thus, according to Lawbaugh, the waiver does not apply.    
 Lawbaugh admits, however, that the District Court’s post-conviction order in no 
way modified his sentence.  That order granted Lawbaugh’s motion solely to provide him 
with an opportunity to file a notice of appeal to preserve review of the unwaivable issues 
not covered by the waiver provision.  Entry of the order required the District Court to 
temporarily vacate his sentence, but it then, in Lawbaugh’s own words, “summarily re-
entered the exact same sentence,” and “denied all the other issues raised.”5  Though 
Lawbaugh tries to differentiate the two, it is telling that nearly all of his appellate claims 
are based on errors the District Court purportedly made during the initial sentencing 
hearing.6  Because the “reentered” sentence is identical to the “original” one, we conclude 
that this appeal is barred by the appellate waiver.7 
 
 
4 Appellant’s Reply at 4; see also Appellant’s Br. at 7 n.4. 
5 Appellant’s Br. at 7.   
6 See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 11 (arguing that the District Court “plainly committed 
error” because “[a]t the sentencing hearing, after approximately two hours of testimony 
and argument, the [D]istrict [C]ourt immediately segued into a rote dictation of its sentence 
without offering any explanation for it.”). 
7 Despite his concession that the sentences are identical, Lawbaugh argues in reply 
that the reentered sentence somehow modified the original.  He cites United States v. 






 Because we conclude that the waiver covers this appeal, we will enforce it unless 
our doing so would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”8  To determine whether such an 
injustice would occur, we must look to the merits of Lawbaugh’s claims, recognizing that 
“it will be a rare and unusual situation when claims of an unreasonable sentence, standing 
alone, will be sufficient to invalidate a waiver because of a miscarriage of justice.”9 
 Lawbaugh argues that the District Court made procedural and substantive errors in 
determining his sentence.  Procedurally, he argues that the District Court did not 
sufficiently state its reasons for imposing the 40-year sentence.  Though the District Court 
 
 
waiver does not always preclude a defendant from challenging a future modification to his 
sentence.  But in Wilson, the defendant’s original sentence was later modified to require 
participation in a mental-health program as a condition of supervised release that was not 
initially imposed.  See id. at 414, 416.  Wilson does not compel a different result here.   
8 “[W]aivers of appeals are generally permissible if entered into knowingly and 
voluntarily, unless they work a miscarriage of justice.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 558.  The 
“miscarriage of justice” inquiry requires us to consider the “clarity of the error, its gravity, 
its character . . . the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error 
on the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result.”  Id. at 
563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)).  Substantial 
evidence supports the conclusion that Lawbaugh understood the terms and scope of the 
waiver when he voluntarily entered his guilty plea.  See, e.g., App. 38a (The Court: “Do 
you also understand that you have waived a direct appeal? Normally, a defendant is entitled 
to appeal not only his conviction but his sentence, and you have waived taking an 
appeal.  Do you understand that?”  Defendant: “Yes, Your Honor.”) 





heard hours of testimony on Lawbaugh’s diagnosis, it did not explicitly reference the 
details of that testimony on the record.  But where the matter before the court is 
straightforward and the record, as a whole, “makes clear that the sentencing judge 
considered the evidence and arguments, . . . the law [does not] require[] the judge to write 
more extensively.”10  Here, the record is clear that the court heard extensive testimony 
regarding the diagnosis and overruled certain of the Government’s objections with respect 
to the same.  Additionally, the District Court stated that it had read Lawbaugh’s expert 
report, which also discussed the diagnosis, prior to sentencing.  The District Court was 
further advised that the Government had no objections to the presentence report, explicitly 
stated that it had reviewed Lawbaugh’s submission with respect to the same, and invited 
his counsel to expound on it.  The record as a whole confirms that the District Court 
meaningfully considered Lawbaugh’s diagnosis in calculating the sentence, even if it did 
not necessarily say so on the record.   
Substantively, Lawbaugh argues that the District Court did not give enough weight 
to his Asperger’s, and so did not properly weigh the sentencing factors set forth in 18 
 
 
10 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (“We acknowledge that the judge 
might have said more.  He might have added explicitly that he had heard and considered 
the evidence and argument; . . . and that he found [defendant’s] personal circumstances 
here were simply not different enough to warrant a different sentence.  But context and the 





U.S.C. § 3553.  Again, the record reflects that the District Court meaningfully considered 
the mitigating evidence that Lawbaugh presented.  The District Court then considered the 
Government’s request for a 100-year sentence and Lawbaugh’s request for the 25-year 
mandatory minimum.  The District Court ultimately imposed a 40-year sentence, which 
represents a 60% downward variance from the Government’s request.  The District Court 
then concluded on the record that this result was “sufficient but not greater than necessary” 
based on the crimes committed.11  Nothing suggests that the District Court ignored 
Lawbaugh’s diagnosis in determining the length of his sentence.   
The record does not show that the District Court made any procedural or substantive 
error in calculating Lawbaugh’s sentence.  We therefore conclude that there will be no 
“miscarriage of justice” should the waiver be enforced.  As such, we conclude that this 
appeal is barred by the appellate waiver, decline to consider the merits further, and 
otherwise affirm the decision of the District Court.     
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.   
 
 
11 App. 146a. 
